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I. Introduction 
 “One of the great paradoxes of the progress of human rights thinking is that many 
prominent governments. . . basically believe that human rights are only relevant for other 
countries.”1  The United States is no exception.  It is undisputed that the United States is the 
wealthiest country in the world.  This fact would lead any rational person to believe that even the 
most basic human rights would be afforded to the citizens of such a wealthy country.  However, 
for those who live in the United States, it is obvious to see that many basic human rights are 
lacking, including the right to education.  The right to education has been an area of law in which 
the United States has been a consistent underachiever.   
 In the United States, there is no explicitly enumerated positive fundamental federal 
constitutional right to education.  Due to this deficiency in the Constitution, state governments 
have been in control of the right to education under the guidance of the Tenth Amendment.2  
State and local authorities have had the responsibility to determine the amount of education and 
right to that education for the citizenry.  However, sometimes the federal government finds itself 
encroaching on the power the Constitution has delegated to the states, and changing the tide.   
 To add to this confusion, the international community has set standards by promulgating 
several conventions regarding the right to education.  These conventions have granted the 
citizens of State parties an affirmative, or positive, right to education.  Since the United States is 
not a party to any of the conventions that will be addressed in this article, many countries are left 
wondering why.  U.S. citizens are left wondering why the government is so reluctant on binding 
itself to providing an affirmative right to education.  It has also left citizens wondering what 
would it take for the U.S. to be in compliance with the international community’s ideals of a 
positive right to education.   
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 Section 1 of this paper will explore the current status of U.S. education law concerning 
the right to education.  It will look at the right to education the federal government bestows on its 
citizenry through Supreme Court decisions and statutory entitlements.  Following a look into the 
federal provisions, the article will assess the status of state constitutional and statutory rights of 
education.   
 In section 2, the focus will shift to the international community.  The relevant 
conventions dealing with the issue of a right to education will be examined and analyzed to 
illustrate current international law and the right to education afforded to State parties.  In 
addition, the customary interpretation and implementation of these conventions will be explored.  
This article will study the legal ramifications of these conventions, specifically in terms of 
obligations imparted on State parties and on the U.S.    
 The final section of this paper will explore whether the United States is in compliance 
with international legal standards.  It will examine the tough questions regarding obligations that 
would arise under the current international conventions for U.S. lawmakers.  It will explore the 
possible steps the United States will have to take to bring its educational efforts up to par with 
the ideals of the international community.  This paper will not attempt to address the issue of 
quality of education or the issue of what quantum of education is acceptable.  In addition, this 
paper is not a comparison of U.S. law and the law of another specific nation but rather a 
comparison of U.S. law with the ideals of the international community, regardless if any one 
country actually achieves the convention mandates.   
I. U.S. Education Law 
 U.S. education law has developed under both the federal system and the state systems.  
The U.S. Constitution does not explicitly enumerate a positive fundamental right to 
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education.3  However, it has long been debated whether the U.S. Constitution implicitly 
enumerates a positive fundamental right to education.4 Therefore, the Supreme Court and 
federal and state legislatures have been the catalysts through which the right to education has 
been developed.   
 In federal constitutional law, there exist two types of rights.  Here we will look at these 
types within the framework of education.  One is a negative right to education, which was 
recognized in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).  A negative right to education is the 
right to have the government not interfere with your attempt to acquire learning.5  The other 
is called a positive right to education which is something that the Supreme Court has never 
recognized in the context of education.  A positive right would be an affirmative right that 
the government must provide a certain quantum or quality of education.6  In essence, the 
government would guarantee the citizenry a certain level of education that it must provide.7  
In addition to positive and negative rights, federal constitutional rights can be seen as 
fundamental or non-fundamental rights.  This issue of fundamental and non-fundamental will 
be addressed in the below subsection.      
 a. Supreme Court Decisions  
 First, let us explore this constitutional right to education, positive or negative, from the 
Supreme Court’s perspective.  As mentioned earlier, Meyer v. Nebraska, was the earliest case 
in which the Supreme Court addressed this right.8  In this case, a state law that prohibited the 
teaching of a foreign language before completion of the eighth grade was struck down.9   The 
action was brought as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.10  The 
court decided that the statute violated the Due Process Clause because it disregarded 
pertinent fundamental rights guaranteed by the clause, including the right to acquire useful 
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knowledge.11  A fundamental right is one that is implicitly or explicitly found within the 
language of the Constitution or disadvantages a particular suspect class while everything not 
regarded as fundamental is found to be non-fundamental like the current right to education.12  
Even though the court did not address the question of a fundamental positive right to 
education, it did express the first federal negative right to education by stating that the state 
did not have the right to interfere with the right to acquire knowledge.13 
 Several years following the Meyer decision, the court again addressed this negative right 
to education in Pierce v. Society of Sisters.14  Under the same theory as in Meyer, several 
private school operators sought injunctive relief against an Oregon compulsory school 
attendance law that required public school attendance of children between the ages of eight 
and sixteen.15  The court in this case again reaffirmed the negative right to education 
developed in Meyer when the court decided that this statute violated the substantive due 
process right of not interfering with the right to acquire knowledge.16  The court recognized 
an affirmative, or positive, fundamental right of a parent to rear the education of their child.17 
However, again, the question of a fundamental positive right to education went unanswered. 
 In Brown v. Board of Education, a unanimous court decided that de jure racial 
segregation in public elementary and secondary schools is violative of the Constitution’s 
Equal Protection Clause.18  Although the court addressed the question of racial segregation 
and not the issue of a right to education, the court did take the opportunity to indirectly 
support a positive fundamental right of education in its dicta.19  In its opinion, the court 
stated, “Education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. . . 
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he 
is denied the opportunity of an education.  Such an opportunity, where the state has 
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undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.”20  By 
doing so, the court affirmed the principle that education is essential to an effective 
democratic society.21  Even though dicta is not binding on the judiciary, it is good evidence 
of the importance the court places on education and stresses the importance of the 
educational opportunity.22  Furthermore, it assures Supreme Court support in upholding the 
right to education in situations in which the state has positively guaranteed it.  
 Following Brown’s promising language, however, was the case of San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, where the court did weigh in its opinion as to 
whether some quantum of education should be a positive fundamental right in the United 
States or remain a non-fundamental right.  A constitutional challenge was brought on behalf 
of Mexican-American schoolchildren under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment against a Texas system of financing public education through local property 
taxes.23 The statute provided for state funded educational systems that caused low property 
tax base districts to receive fewer funds than high property tax base districts.24  Plaintiffs 
urged that the statute be struck down under strict scrutiny analysis, which is the must 
stringent review that can be carried out by the Supreme Court.25  However, to receive this 
level of review, it is necessary that a fundamental right is impinged or a suspect class is 
adversely affected.26   
 The court refused to recognize a positive fundamental right to education claiming that 
there was not a total deprivation of a right to education.27  It stated that not only did the 
Constitution fail to explicitly guarantee any right to education but it did not implicitly 
guarantee this right either when the plaintiffs tried to argue that for meaningful exercise of 
the free speech and right to vote clauses, a right of education needed to be provided.28  In 
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response, the court denied this argument stating, “we have never presumed to possess either 
the ability or the authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech or the most 
informed electoral choice.”29  The court made it clear that education is important to society 
but this importance does not alone support an implicit finding of a positive fundamental right 
to education in the Constitution.30  Although the court did not believe this funding scheme 
violated the federal Constitution, in its dicta, the court did allude to the possibility that to 
protect other rights such as free speech under the Constitution there might be some quantum 
of education that needs protection.31  However, the court was not faced with this decision in 
Rodriguez because the plaintiffs were not denied all access to education just that of equal 
education.32 
 After Rodriguez, a positive fundamental right to education appeared lost. Then, in 1982, 
the court decided Plyler v. Doe.  This decision has left the constitutional positive 
fundamental right to education debate perplexing.  A violation of the Equal Protection Clause 
was brought when children of Mexican decent were denied all educational opportunity in 
Texas.33  The court reaffirmed the Rodriguez holding that the right to education is not a 
fundamental positive right under the Constitution but on the basis of the alien status of the 
plaintiffs, the statute was struck down as violative of the Equal Protection Clause.34 Although 
the court determined this case using intermediate scrutiny based on the suspect class 
involved, the court appeared to support the idea that the right to education required a more 
stringent level of review than rational basis, which is the lowest level of review, but not to 
the level of strict scrutiny.35  To come to this conclusion, the court stated, “public education 
is not a right granted to individuals by the Constitution. . . neither is it merely some 
governmental benefit indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation.”36  
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This would require the court to examine cases involving the right to education with a higher 
level of scrutiny than rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strike down more pervasive 
statutes.37 
 As a result of the Plyler decision, the question of a fundamental positive right to 
education remained unresolved.  Papasan v. Allian was seen as the court’s opportunity to 
bring resolution to this question.38  In this case, the court upheld a Mississippi statute that 
distributed educational land trust funds disproportionately so as to deny plaintiffs with 
minimally adequate education.39 Plaintiffs, though, did not provide any factual basis that they 
were denied minimal education and therefore, the court declined the opportunity to address 
the issue of a fundamental positive right to education.40 
 Even though the Supreme Court has not recognized a positive fundamental right to 
education at this point, the debate has not ended.  As seen in Papasan v. Allain, the court 
confirmed that the question as to whether the right to education is a positive fundamental 
right remains open.41  Therefore, the court could still be persuaded to implicitly find this 
fundamental right in the Constitution.  Various other pieces of evidence could provide a 
persuasive basis for the Supreme Court to recognize a fundamental positive right to 
education.   
 As announced in the case of Michael H v. Gerald D., another possible way of recognizing 
a fundamental substantive due process right, such as education, can be through the use of 
history and tradition regarding that interest.42 In Michael H., the court refused to recognize a 
putative father’s interest in his birth child partially based on the historical and traditional 
evidence of denying this interest.43  At the time of the birth child’s conception, the mother 
was married to another man and this other man is therefore presumed to be the father of the 
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child in the state of California.44  The court made it apparent that not only does the right need 
be fundamental but “the Due Process Clause affords only those protections ‘so rooted in the 
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.’”45  Michael H.’s 
interest as biological father did not outweigh the sanctity of the marital family in the court’s 
mind and he was denied his interest under the Due Process Clause.46  If this same approach is 
taken with the right to education, as shown above, there is a deep societal interest in the value 
of education and the necessity of education.47  A case could be made on behalf of a 
fundamental positive right to education using the dicta of the many Supreme Court decisions 
and the emerging statutory provisions to find this right under the Due Process Clause of the 
Constitution.48  The use of tradition and history in Michael H. adds an additional source of 
evidence for the court to use when it examines the right to education.  It also gives the 
claimants another possible argument to win the debate on a fundamental positive right to 
education.     
b. Federal Statutory Grants of the Right to Education  
 In 1975, Congress enacted the Education for All Handicapped Children Act which has 
been revised and renamed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).49  This act 
creates a federal positive fundamental right to education for those who are disabled.50  As 
long as the child fits the criteria under the act, the child is guaranteed a “free appropriate 
education in the least restrictive environment.”51  To be eligible under this act, three things 
are required: 1) the child must be between the age of three and twenty-one; 2) the child must 
have a specifically identified disability; and 3) the child must also be in need of special 
education and its related services.52  Although the act is vague in describing what 
“appropriate education” means, it appears necessary that some educational benefit must 
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materialize.53  Nonetheless, the IDEA provides a positive right to education by the federal 
government for a certain class of citizens. 
 Then, in 2002, Congress enacted the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB).54  This act was 
designed to improve student achievement with various far-ranging provisions.  The more 
vital of these provisions purport that states must take steps to improve academic achievement 
among the economically disadvantaged if the states are to receive federal funds, highly 
qualified teachers must be trained and recruited, improved English proficiency must be 
provided to students that have English as a second language, schools shall become more 
accountable for academic achievement, research based teaching methods that have been 
proven effective must be used, and parents shall be afforded better school choice especially if 
the local schools are inadequate.55 “The [intended] purpose of [NCLB] is to ensure that all 
children have a fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality education and 
reach, at a minimum, proficiency on challenging State academic achievement standards and 
state academic assessments.”56  The NCLB is seen as a federal attempt to improve 
educational equity and reduce the necessity to bring constitutional claims or educational 
malpractice suits.57  At the very least, this over 1,100 page document could be seen as 
evidence of a federal statement of a positive fundamental right to education.58  Its provisions 
appear to express willingness by the federal government to undertake an obligation to 
provide some guaranteed right to education and federal supervision and accountability of that 
right if the states do not abide or follow the mandates of the act.  This idea might not have 
been the intention of Congress but it provides a good resource, along with tradition of the 
importance of education, other statutes, and prior decisions, in helping along the idea of a 
positive fundamental right to education under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.   
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 c. State Schemes 
 Despite the reluctance of the Supreme Court to recognize a positive fundamental right to 
education, the purview of the Tenth Amendment has entrusted the right to education in the 
U.S. to the states.  “With regard to education, states not only control access to education but 
also have the responsibility to provide every child with a free, appropriate education.” 59  
“Most state constitutions do put an affirmative duty on the state to provide education.”60 Not 
all state courts have recognized the right to education as fundamental but each state has 
recognized the importance to the citizenry of education.61  For example, some states use strict 
scrutiny to determine if the right to education in that particular state is being impeded while 
others view the right as substantial and use an intermediate scrutiny test to determine if the 
right to education is being impeded.62  Both of these levels of scrutiny, as mentioned earlier, 
are more stringent and provide more protection to the right to education than that provided by 
the Supreme Court’s use of rational basis, or the lowest level of scrutiny, to examine the right 
to education.63  Therefore, under state law, citizens are provided a higher obligation to be 
afforded the right to education and in some states, guaranteed the positive right to 
education.64  In addition, the Supreme Court, in Plyler, recognized that if a state undertakes 
the obligation to provide free public education, it cannot rationally deny a child from 
receiving it.65  Based on the state constitutions and state courts, the fundamental right to 
education would appear to be more welcome by them than by the Supreme Court.66  “All 
fifty states guarantee their citizens the right to a public education.”67 
 Furthermore, all states have passed laws requiring children to attend school.68  These 
compulsory attendance laws began in Massachusetts in 1852 until all states had passed these 
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laws in the early 1900’s.69  Compulsory education laws are added evidence that states are 
committed to advancing education and look positively on its advancement.   
 Currently, the federal courts do not recognize the positive right to education for its 
citizens.  However, it is clear that the federal government and courts place high importance 
on education in the U.S. and recent emerging statues like NCLB provide evidence which 
could push the U.S. towards recognizing a federal fundamental positive right to education.  
As for now, most citizens will have to depend on the state constitutional and statutory grants 
to gain access to education.  
II. International Human Rights Law 
 The international community has valued the need for education for decades.  The 
community has actively worked towards achieving uniform educational standards, regarding 
the right to education, since the inception of the United Nations.  Various conventions have 
been drafted and implemented world wide that incorporate these ideals. The two most 
important international conventions that address the right to education will be the focus of 
this paper: the Convention on the Rights of Child and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, & Cultural Rights.  The United States has not ratified either one of these 
conventions but the United States has signed both of these conventions, classifying it as 
merely a signatory.70   
 a. How does a country become bound to an international convention?  
 Before we examine the standards set forth in these conventions, it is imperative that a 
brief explanation of how a country becomes bound to an international convention is 
undertaken.  In 1969, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention) 
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was created.71  This convention sets forth the procedure to bind a country to an international 
convention.72   
 Under Article 11 of the Vienna Convention, a state can become bound by a treaty by 
either expressing by signature, exchanging of instruments, ratification, acceptance, approval 
or accession, or by any other means so agreed.73  In Article 12, it states that a party may be 
bound by signature but only if the treaty provides that the signature will have such an 
effect.74  In this instance, both conventions mentioned above, require consent to be in the 
form of ratification before the country will become bound by its terms.75  Ratification would 
automatically make the signatory a party and bind it to the convention.76 As the U.S. has not 
ratified either convention, it is not bound by its terms nor is it a party.  In essence, the U.S. 
has no obligation to fulfill the provisions expounded in its mandate.  Nevertheless, under 
Article 18 of the Vienna Convention, the United States must “refrain from acts which would 
defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when it has signed the treaty. . .”77  With the 
inclusion of this article in the Vienna Convention it appears that the U.S. may have obligated 
itself to some quantum of education when it signed both conventions.  Problematic, however, 
is the fact that the United States has never ratified the Vienna Convention and is technically 
not bound by its terms.  Despite this fact, the articles under the Vienna Convention have been 
practiced and followed even without its ratification in the U.S. and world-wide.  Generally, 
the Vienna Convention reflects binding customary international law.78  According to the U.S. 
Restatement on Foreign Relations, customary international law is a source of interpretation 
of the obligations the U.S. assumes as a member of the international community.79  Since the 
Vienna Convention has attained the status of customary international law, U.S. lawmakers 
and courts will use the Vienna Convention to determine the U.S.’s obligations under these 
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conventions.80  Therefore, it appears the U.S. bound itself to the terms of the Vienna 
Convention without official ratification of its terms.81 
 b. A Look to the Conventions 
 Even though the United States is not technically bound by the terms of the conventions, 
to understand why the U.S. has not ratified these treaties and what obligations might arise if 
it did so, it is crucial to look at the relevant provisions of these conventions in some depth.  In 
addition, it would be beneficial to lay out a brief history of how these two conventions arose.  
 In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution that became known as 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.82  In Article 26 of this resolution, it stated, 
“Everyone has a right to education.  Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and 
fundamental stages.  Elementary education shall be compulsory.  Technical and professional 
education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible 
to all on the basis of merit.”83  This resolution was not a treaty but merely aspirations 
declared by the international community as important.  “It was not intended to impose legal 
obligations on States, but rather to establish goals for States to work towards.”84  This 
Declaration has been reaffirmed not only by the United Nations on several occasions but has 
inspired numerous constitutions world-wide.  Additionally, some of its articles have been 
codified by treaty, as will be seen in the subsequent conventions.85  Furthermore, “its 
constant and widespread recognition means that the principles it contains can now be 
regarded as part of customary law.”86 
 Convention on the Rights of the Child (Children’s Convention) 
 In 1990, the Convention on the Rights of the Child was put into force.87  This is the most 
universally ratified treaty in the world with only the United States and Somalia not 
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ratifying.88  The convention undertakes the obligation to provide the children of the world a 
uniform and common respect for their basic human rights.89  Included in this list of 
obligations to the child is the positive right to education.90   
 Under Article 28, the convention requires that “States parties recognize the right of the 
child to education.”91  Moreover the article lays out various measures that each party must 
achieve by progressive means and on the basis of equal opportunity.92  The provision 
includes making primary education compulsory and available free to all, encouraging the 
development of different forms of secondary education, making higher education accessible 
to all, making educational and vocational information and guidance available, and taking 
measures to encourage regular attendance at schools and reduction of drop-out rates.93  With 
all of these affirmative obligations, the right to education under the Children’s Convention is 
a positive right.94  
 With such lofty and ambiguous obligations, parties are not always sure what steps need to 
be taken and how quickly.  The Convention attempts to provide an answer to these questions.  
Article 4 states, “States parties shall undertake all appropriate legislation, administrative, and 
other measures for the implementation of the rights recognized in the present Convention.”95  
Economic and social rights, which the positive right to education is one, shall be realized to 
the “maximum extent of their available resources.”96   
 Even with these guidelines of what needs to be done and when it needs to be done, parties 
are still unsure of what obligations must be fulfilled.  This is one of the reasons the United 
Nations has set up a monitoring committee to provide answers to State parties.  “The 
Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) is the body of independent experts that 
monitors implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child by its State parties.”97  
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Parties are compelled to submit various reports to the committee about what they are doing to 
implement the treaty.98  The committee then makes concluding observations about the party’s  
progress and makes recommendations about what steps need to be taken to be to further 
compliance.99  Since, as mentioned above, the U.S. has not ratified either treaty, it does not 
have to submit reports nor are recommendations and observations about its compliance 
given.  In addition to these concluding observations, the Committee also issues general 
comments about a particular provision.100  These general comments provide the Committee’s 
interpretation of the various provisions set forth in the convention.101   
 By using the general comments, this paper will try to alleviate the ambiguities created by 
Article 4 and Article 28 so as to determine more concise obligations for states.  The 
Committee has not produced general comments for the sections of Article 28.  However, 
there are several concluding observations that could provide useful to interpret the 
responsibilities under Article 28.  According to the general comment to Article 4, numerous 
obligations are implied in its terms and in some circumstances, these burdens are onerous.  
Each State party is reminded that it has the obligation to fulfill the mandate of the Children’s 
Convention even if it delegates its responsibilities to lower governments, private 
organizations, or non-profit organizations.102  All sectors of society must be engaged and the 
views of children themselves should be given high priority and should be assessed 
regularly.103  Children are best able to determine if their rights are being realized and 
protected.104  Government should be opened extensively for input by children and new 
measures should be taken based on these suggestions.105  The Committee goes as far as to 
recommend that the development of a new division in each department designated solely to 
address children’s rights would be necessary to fulfill a parties’ obligations under the 
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convention.106  This could be a very daunting task imposing a very substantial and time-
consuming burden on State parties.  State parties are obligated to provide to the maximum 
extent of their resources the widest possible enjoyment of the Convention’s provisions.107  
The most disadvantaged groups are to be given priority yet discrimination is not allowed 
under any circumstances.108  The obligations under this Convention are not to be seen as 
charitable to any one particular group.109   
 The Committee has determined that all obligations must be implemented with respect to 
the general measures outlined in its comment.  In order to determine what this means in 
practical terms, the concluding observations and recommendations given to parties under 
Article 28 will be useful.  Legislation can be implemented as a means to ensure these 
rights.110 In Argentina, the Committee recommended that the country enforce its Social Plan 
of Education legislation to ensure regular attendance at school and reduce drop-out rates, 
especially for the most disadvantaged children.111  In Georgia, the Committee commended 
the adoption of the 1997 Education Act, which had the view of improving the situation of 
education in the State party.112  The Committee welcomed legislation in Italy that extended 
the duration of compulsory education from 8 to 10 years.113  In Burkino Faso, the Committee 
appreciated the country’s adoption of the 1996 Education Act which increased the budget for 
education.114  In Cameroon, the Committee recommended urgent implementation of the 
Finance Act which would make primary education free to all and provide assistance for the 
poor to attend school.115  In all of these cases, legislation helped to further the right to 
education in these respective countries.   
 Coordinating and monitoring bodies should be set up to collect data to alleviate 
discrimination and disparities, raise awareness of child and parents rights under the 
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Convention, develop appropriate programs, and assess budgetary needs of programs.116 
Parties are obligated to analyze groups that may have special needs, apply best standards in 
implementing new procedures, and liberally interpret development of these provisions.117  
This obligation includes independent budgets for its implementation, reporting progress on a 
national level, and specially training individuals to further the Article’s interests.118  
 The obligations raised in the above paragraph seem to be the most troubling areas for 
State parties especially in terms of reduction of drop-out rates and regular school 
attendance.119 An increased budget to improve the quality of education and to reduce the 
drop-out rate and ensure regular attendance was recommended to the country of Argentina.120  
The Committee recommended to the country of Belize that it needs to make its citizens more 
generally aware of their rights under Article 28, especially the more disadvantaged classes.121  
Additionally, the Committee was concerned that the high drop-out rate, the goals and 
infrastructure of education as a whole, and the economically disadvantaged were not being 
addressed.122  To alleviate these problems, the Committee recommends the use of media to 
create awareness of rights, a reinforcement of adequate training and facilities, and more 
attention be focused on reducing economic disparity.123  In Burkino Faso, the Committee 
mandated the government to determine the causes for high drop-out rates and take all 
necessary measures to make primary education completely free and then help children attend 
secondary school.124  China must focus on reviewing the disparities in the urban-rural areas 
to address the possible re-allocation of resources.125  In Georgia, the Committee urged the 
country to increase its level of public expenditure on education and to collect disaggregated 
data on drop-out rates and expulsions.126  The Committee’s main concern is with localization 
of funds in households leading to the decline of public funds.127 In the United Kingdom, the 
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Committee recommended that more respect and weight needed to be given to the views of 
the child concerning education.128  Inequalities in educational achievement must be 
eliminated and the impact of privatization of schools must be evaluated by the UK 
government.129 
 Furthermore, the Committee recommends adopting other international human rights 
treaties and making the Convention a part of domestic law as furthering general measures of 
implementation.130  For instance, in Canada, the Committee recommended the ratification of 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Convention against 
Discrimination in Education of 1960 to promote national support to eliminate discrimination 
of Aboriginals.131  As part of the domestic law, the right to a cause of action under the 
provisions should be real and remedies should be genuine.132  The citizens should be able to 
sue under the terms of the Convention if their right to education is being deprived.133  All in 
all the Committee obligates parties to show an actual cross-sectoral makeover to implement 
the provisions of Article 28 with the national government at the helm.134   
 The Convention also places a burden on the States parties on an international level.135  
Each party must promote and assist fellow parties to the fullest extent possible.136  This 
means wealthy, more industrialized countries must attend to the guarantees of the right to 
education in its own country and provide monetary and technical support to other parties as 
necessary or able.137 
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
 In 1976, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights was put 
into force.138  Over three-quarters of UN member states are parties to this convention.139  
“The Covenant guarantees economic, social and cultural rights [and] outlines the legal 
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obligations of states parties under this Covenant.”140  Included in these socioeconomic rights 
is the positive right to education.141 
 Under Article 13, the Covenant states, “States parties. . . recognize the right to everyone 
to education.”142  Additionally, as in the Children’s Convention, the Covenant outlines 
several conditions that must be achieved.   
  “States parties . . . recognize. . . :  1) Primary education shall be compulsory and 
 available free to all; 2) Secondary education. . . shall be made generally available and 
 accessible to all by every appropriate means. . . 4) Higher education shall be made 
 equally accessible to all. . . and in particular by the progressive introduction of free 
 education; 5) free Fundamental education shall be encouraged or intensified. . . for those 
 people who have not received or completed the whole of their primary education; 6) The 
 development of a system of schools at all levels shall be actively pursued.143   
 The Covenant also attempts to guide States Parties in implementing its mandate.  Article 
2 states that  
 “Each state party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and 
 through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to 
 the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
 realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, 
 including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.”144 
This Covenant does not require immediate implementation but instead requires a more 
progressive approach to its implementation.145  
 Similar to the Children’s Convention, “the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (CESCR) is the body of independent experts that monitors implementation of the 
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International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights by its States parties.”146  
The process of monitoring countries under the Covenant is consistent with the process under 
the Children’s Convention.147  CESCR develops its own general comments and concluding 
observations to provide guidance to the Covenant parties.148 
 Using the general comments and concluding observations of Article 13 and Article 2, this 
paper will attempt to alleviate the ambiguities of those provisions of the Covenant.  Since 
Article 2 explains the extent to which the obligations of Article 13 must be fulfilled, the 
analysis will begin with an examination of Article 2.  Article 2 creates obligations of both 
conduct and of result.149  Each state party must take steps towards realizing these obligations 
that are “deliberate, concrete and targeted” within a reasonably short period of time after the 
Covenant goes into force.150  Due to the nature of these rights, the Committee understands 
that immediate full realization is not always possible but the Committee requires expeditious 
and effective measures to be taken.151 This will most often be accomplished through 
legislation but adoption of legislation is by no means exhaustive of the responsibilities.152  
Financial, administrative, social, and educational measures are other suggestions made by the 
Committee.153  Although, no matter what measure is taken, the state must ensure that the 
parties trying to enforce these rights have a cause of action under the law.154  Each party 
undertakes these obligations to the widest enjoyment possible by its citizenry.155  Finally, 
each party is committed to using international cooperation and assistance in achieving these 
obligations.156 
 With clarification of Article 2, Article 13 obligations can be discussed and defined with 
more precision for parties. Article 13 happens to be the longest provision in the Covenant and 
the most comprehensive article on the right to education.157  “States parties have immediate 
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obligations, in respect to the right to education, to guarantee that the right will be exercised 
without discrimination of any kind and the obligation to take steps towards full realization of 
Article 13.”158  Although Article 2 understands that full realization of the Covenant will not 
take place immediately, it does require the highest priority be given to primary education 
which should be free and compulsory.159  “Progressive realization of education” should begin 
with free, compulsory primary education taking concrete steps towards free secondary and 
higher education.160  Secondary education must be made generally available, disregarding 
actual capacity and shall be distributed on the same basis to all.161  To have the widest 
possible enjoyment by the citizenry and by all appropriate means, secondary education 
“should adopt varied and innovative approaches to its delivery.”162  Steps must also be taken 
towards achieving free secondary education.163  “Higher education, [on the other hand,] shall 
be made accessible to all, on the basis of capacity.”164  This means that higher education shall 
gradually through targeted measures be made free but can be based on the capacity of the 
individual to attain it.165  To achieve these measures, an “overall development strategy” 
should be “actively pursued” with a high degree of governmental priority and with vigor 
which include benchmarks and indicators to monitor progress.166  At the very least, parties 
must establish “minimum educational standards” that all institutions must follow.167  In 
addition, discrimination must be completely eradicated without progressive realization or 
availability of resources.168  Elimination of discrimination of all forms, including 
racial/ethnic, geographical, and economic, must be fully and immediately realized at all 
levels of education.169  No retrogressive measures can be taken because it would violate 
Article 2’s requirement to fulfillment to the party’s maximum available resources and with 
widest possible enjoyment.170 
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 The expectations under Article 13 of the Covenant have been articulated.  The concluding 
observations will provide a valuable practical interpretation of these treaty provisions.  It is 
apparent in its concluding observations that the Committee has been very dedicated to 
realization of these goals in a progressive manner and on the basis of available resources of 
the particular nation state.  For example, with respect to the positive right of education, in 
China, the Committee called upon the state to make sure that all children gain “access to free 
compulsory education” on a non-discriminatory basis.171  It asked the party to discontinue 
school related fees, to allocate sufficient funds to support free, compulsory education in 
general, and to deliberately target rural groups where drop out rates are higher.172  The 
Committee welcomes the adoption of legislation that will develop and reform the current 
status of education in China.173 However, the Committee did not unrealistically expect or 
command that China provide these measures immediately but gave the country several years 
to implement these recommendations and re-allocate its funds.174  The same is true in states 
such as Kuwait where primary education is not yet compulsory and free.175  The Committee 
recommends that Kuwait immediately develop a plan of action for primary education and set 
goals for its achievement.176  On the other hand, in Canada, the Committee required more of 
Canada because Canada has more available resources to devote to the right to education.  The 
Committee recommended that the party should make higher education accessible by every 
appropriate means, on the basis of capacity.177  The Committee called for the equal treatment 
of African Canadians in the educational sector with targeted programs of action to ensure this 
right.178  These observations confirm that the Committee does prioritize compulsory 
education and expects different levels of compliance depending on a state party’s economic 
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and political status.  In addition, the Committee firmly requires the eradication of 
discrimination immediately as evidenced by the Canadian observation.   
 The Committee also stipulated for budgetary changes.  Regarding Mexico, the 
Committee told the state to increase its educational budget to strengthen and upgrade schools 
for indigenous peoples and other disadvantaged groups and also for intercultural 
education.179  Regarding Chile, the Committee recommended that the economic disparity 
between schools in municipal areas and private schools should be rectified by budgetary 
changes.180  These concluding observations are great resources when countries are trying to 
determine whether wealth and other resources have been adequately appropriated to the 
particular human right.   
 In the international community, education is seen as a basic necessity to the human race.  
Since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the international 
community has strived to set standards regarding human rights.  As seen in the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, education is a priority and fundamental right to all mankind.  The monitoring 
committees set up for these conventions have provided goals to strive towards so that the 
international establishment of human rights standards will be realized.   
III. Is U.S. education law in compliance with international standards?  
 The right to education has evolved uniquely different in the United States than in the 
international sector.  As was mentioned, the Supreme Court has declined to recognize the 
fundamental positive right to education.  In addition, the U.S. has refused to ratify the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights.  Even so, it should be explored whether the U.S. is in compliance with 
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international standards, what strides could possibly be taken to come into compliance, and 
what that means in terms of economic and political changes.   
 At first glance, the U.S. would appear to be complying with international standards based 
on the free, compulsory primary education that every state in the Union provides for within 
their constitutions or statutes.  The tradition of free public education in the U.S. even predates 
the emergence of the human rights movement itself.181  In addition, secondary education is 
compulsory to at least the age of 16 and free to citizens in the U.S.182   Vocational and 
technical education is part of the secondary educational level curricula along with college 
prepatory education.183 This achieves the main goals of both conventions to make primary 
education free and compulsory and of the highest priority.184  In addition, secondary 
education has been varied and available on a free basis to all generally without regard to 
capacity as required under the Children’s Convention and the ICESCR.185  Furthermore, 
under federal statute, handicapped or disabled persons are guaranteed a positive right to 
education.  Under the Children’s Convention and the ICESCR, groups with special needs 
must be provided opportunities to education.186  The federal statute makes guarantees and 
special accommodations so as to provide an affirmative obligation to the disabled of a 
positive right to education.187  It also holds the federal government responsible to provide this 
right.188 
 Besides these positive aspects, according to the international standards enumerated 
above, the U.S. appears to be in non-compliance in several important ways.  The key reasons 
for this are discrimination and economic disparity.189  Underlying these issues is the U.S. 
attitude of exceptionalism.190  The idea that the U.S. does not have to abide by human rights 
laws because of its stature but can hypocritically tell other countries to abide by the rules.191  
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This exceptionalism facilitates the attitude that the U.S. system is better than the international 
standards and that compliance is unnecessary.192 
 Discrimination is of immediate and vital importance in the Children’s Convention and the 
ICESCR.  In each convention, the eradication of discrimination cannot be achieved 
progressively but it must be done so immediately before compliance with the other 
provisions can be met.193  Since Brown, the U.S. has stated its commitment to equal 
opportunity education and has condemned de jure racial segregation in public schools.  
However, in practice, this segregation still exists because priority within public schools has 
shifted its concern from racial and ethnic discrimination to academic accomplishments.194  
Therefore, in public schools more emphasis is placed on what children are learning and to 
what extent rather than if children are getting the same education, in terms of quality and 
quantum, throughout the U.S.195  In essence, pre-Brown claims of inadequate funding and 
inadequate quality of education based on racial and ethnic divides are resurfacing.196 
 Schools are still rampant with segregation and inequality.197  Inferior education 
continually afflicts minorities in the U.S., especially in the south.198  Historical remnants of 
the old south continually foster the ideals of inferiority and devaluation along racial lines.199  
Many minorities are subjected to overcrowded classrooms, dilapidated schools, no textbooks 
or out-dated books, overburdened teachers, unqualified teachers, and disinterested 
administrators.200  Access to educational opportunities becomes limited based on race.201  
The federal government has not effectively developed a national plan that would eradicate 
discrimination immediately nor make education to all more accessible as required under the 
Children’s Convention and the ICESCR.202   
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 In conjunction with racial/ethnic discrimination is economic disparity.  Economic 
disparity adds to the hindrance of educational development in poverty stricken areas which 
are composed of mainly racial minorities.  In many respects, economic inequality is the main 
reason for the vast differences in educational quality and access due to its nature of 
distribution.203  As mentioned above, education is relegated to the states.  This makes funding 
for education discretionary and non-uniform.204  The funding structure of the education 
scheme in the U.S. is localized and varies immensely between urban, rural and suburban 
areas.205   The local school districts develop their own priorities and set their own property 
taxes that pay for education.206  Proportionally to local funding, state and federal 
governments appear to provide little money to school districts.  Therefore, the largest 
educational budgets are found in rich school districts and the poorest districts have the 
smallest budgets.207  Budgets are allocated based on political decision-making and have a 
political agenda behind their allocation instead of being allocated based on equality and 
need.208  Since most economically depressed areas correlate to racial minorities, most racial 
minorities are deprived of equal and desegregated schools.209  This economic disparity 
continues to contribute to discrimination.  Because of this distribution scheme, the 
responsibility to provide a right to education does not rest with the national government 
which is required under the conventions.210  It does not give the U.S. citizens the ability to 
have a cause of action under the federal law if their right to education is being hindered and 
doesn’t make the national government accountable for not providing uniform education.  By 
continuing this type of economic distribution, the U.S. is not working to achieve uniformity 
in educational goals or the access to such education economically capable by all.  Therefore, 
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it cannot be in compliance with the international conventions.  Since discrimination is so 
closely linked with economic inequality, it is unable to traverse this problem also.    
 In addition, the U.S. cannot begin to address concerns of higher education, including 
attainment by all who have the capacity to do so, with its current status of economic and 
racial discrimination.  These problems would need to be addressed first before the U.S. could 
concentrate on making higher education free to all, on the basis of capacity.  The U.S. cannot 
be in compliance with international human rights conventions if it will not aptly and 
immediately address the issue of racial discrimination in its primary and secondary schools 
nor its apparent economic disparity.   
 A central challenge to this goal is the lack of representation of children.  Under the 
Children’s Convention, it is quite evident that the international community requires that 
children have a voice in their education.211  In fact, the Children’s Convention includes a 
provision that speaks directly to inclusion of the children’s voice.212  However, in the U.S., 
“children have no recognized right to articulate and defend their own vision of what their 
education should be.”213  Since the Supreme Court has only recognized the Constitutional 
Due Process right of the parent to control their child’s education, only the parent has control 
through litigation or voting to change the direction of the child’s education.214  Children are 
therefore denied their right to be subjects of that right and are denied any valid exercise of 
the right to education.215  “All children suffer the consequences of their lack of political 
voice.”216   
 Even though the U.S. would like to believe it is the purveyor of human rights, it does not 
even guarantee nor fully comply with the goals expounded by the international human rights 
standards on the right to education.  How would current U.S. law have to change to comply 
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with these conventions?  Would the ratification of these conventions substantially change the 
way the U.S. handles education law?   
 At this time, education is an option the state government need not provide.  There are no 
mandatory funding amounts required by the federal or state governments.  The federal 
government has not recognized a positive fundamental right to education.  Discrimination, 
economic disparity, and educational inequality are still prominent in U.S. education.  Politics 
govern who gets the money and who accomplishes the most learning.  What could be done to 
change this?   
 Federal action needs to be taken.  Some believe it would only require the recognition of a 
positive fundamental right to education under the Constitution while others believe that a 
constitutional amendment is necessary.  Seemingly, according to international legal 
standards, any degree of recognition of a positive fundamental right would be a step in the 
right direction because of the benefits it would bring to education.  Under the current regime, 
the federal government is seen as devoid of the power to act and complacent in the realm of 
education.217  States lack the financial capacity and political cohesion to completely fulfill 
their obligations to provide education equally to all of their citizens.218  If the federal 
government were to recognize a positive right to education it would be obligated to work 
with states to ensure education to all.219  “The federal government could bring. . . the 
financial resources, the visible leadership, the coordinating capacity, and the focus on 
national interest.”220  Developing a constitutional positive right to education would re-enforce 
its importance in our society and elevate its respect nationwide.221   
 In the marginal debates, some believe that only a constitutional amendment could achieve 
the goals of international human rights standards.  This amendment would “place the [U.S.] 
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in the company of nearly every industrialized nation.”222  It would give the U.S. the 
legitimacy to advocate freedom and democracy worldwide that the right to education 
coincides with.223  Such an amendment would force the Supreme Court to face the 
educational history of race and wealth distinctions.224  There would be no more so called 
passing the buck.  The Supreme Court and the federal government could no longer hide 
behind the actions of the states.  In reality, the U.S., if it were to ratify the Children’s 
Convention and ICESCR, it would be unable to hide behind the Constitution anyway.  The 
conventions give ultimate responsibility to the State parties no matter if they delegate the 
power to other organizations either public or private to ensure the rights under it.225  In 
addition, the amendment would re-enforce the importance of education in our democratic 
society and elevate its respect.226  It would “undo the damage from the widespread denial of 
equal educational opportunity that has resulted from [Supreme Court] decisions.”227  In doing 
so, national attention will turn to the failing state of our educational system and work towards 
fixing it.228 
 Either way the U.S. decides to handle the right, it will vastly change the way the U.S. 
manages education.  Since federalization of the right might be the only viable option to come 
into compliance with international human rights standards, the federal government would be 
faced with shifting financial resources and political backlash from more wealthy and 
supportive lobbying groups or states.229  The U.S. educational history is so grounded in 
localization and state control over education it would be difficult to create uniformity of the 
education process without vast shifts in power.   
 The most glaring problem will be the financial redistribution.230  As mentioned in the 
opening paragraph to this paper, the U.S. is the wealthiest country in the world.  It has the 
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resources to provide the federal positive right to education but it does not have the 
prioritization that such a task would require.  Ratifying the conventions would take the U.S. 
out of the signatory bracket where respect for the object and purpose of the mission needs to 
be given and place it into the obligation bracket where it would have to fulfill the mandates 
in the conventions and the recommendations of the Committee.  Without alleviating the 
highly visible racial discrimination and the apparent economic disparity, the U.S. would 
never pass muster under the Committee guidelines.  Funding would need to be re-allocated 
so that more equal distribution occurred.  It would be unacceptable to continue the current 
structure of local taxes because it would continually feed the inequality in the educational 
system.231  The Supreme Court and the federal government would have to find themselves 
taxing on a national level to fund the right to education.  Congress could no longer condition 
funds and make allocations on a discretionary basis.232  The political branches would have to 
allocate funds in the budget for education and debates would shift regarding funding to how 
to make allocation equal among the districts based on an affirmative right to education.233 
 Affirmative steps to end discrimination would also need to be taken.  This might even 
require the recognition by the Supreme Court of a suspect class under economic disparity 
which it would not be ready for.  According to Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools and 
Papasan v. Allain, the Supreme Court has refused to recognize a higher level of scrutiny than 
rational basis for claims of economic disparity.234  The Supreme Court declined to recognize 
wealth as a suspect class and therefore, most cases are upheld in light of apparent economic 
disparity.235  However, with a reorganization of the public funds and the guaranteed right to 
education, more people would be able to exercise and demand equality.  This financial 
redistribution would eliminate some of the race and wealth issues prevalent in our 
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educational system.  Educational funding would be equal.  In doing so, each child in U.S. 
public schools would be obtaining the same opportunities to acquire learning instead of the 
opportunities the local taxes could provide.   
 The U.S. would need to give a voice to the children.  Under the conventions, it is 
important the person who owns the right be able to exercise that right especially under the 
Children’s Convention.  The federal government would have to work out a system where 
children were given an opportunity to give their input and their needs were actually taken 
into consideration.  Since parents are given the Constitutional right to direct the upbringing 
of their children, this might be difficult to enforce in the U.S.  It would require the Supreme 
Court to recognize a constitutional right for children to rear their own education.  It would 
also hinder the right of the parent under the Constitution to be able to rear their child’s 
upbringing.  Therefore, giving more voice to children could create this conflict of interest 
that would result in a violation of the Constitution.  A possible avenue to rectify this problem 
would be to set up a special unit in each governmental department that would be completely 
dedicated to children’s concerns.236    
 In reality, ratification of the conventions by the U.S. would dramatically change the 
political landscape of education.  The state governments would most likely have to  
relinquish a lot of control to the federal government whom would have to redistribute wealth, 
tax nationally, and eliminate discrimination since it would be the federal government’s 
responsibility to implement the conventions.  Furthermore, the federal government would 
have to consider making wealth a suspect or quasi-suspect class and allow children to have a 
voice in the educational process and its rearing.  The perception of who is responsible for 
education and who pays for education would have to be altered and a new found respect for 
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education declared.  Additionally, under the conventions, the U.S. would be obligated to 
provide international assistance and cooperation when necessary.237  Due to the enormous 
economic resources available in the U.S., its financial support would be overwhelming 
necessary.  This could further require the need for expansion in the federal budget and more 
of an international obligation that the politicians are unwilling to contribute to.   
 Realistically, the Committees would have a hard time enforcing the U.S.’s compliance 
with the provisions of the conventions.  That appears to be the eternal problem in 
international human rights law.  The United Nations works diligently to ensure that States 
parties fully comply with the conventions and fulfill their mandates.  However, the United 
Nations has no real enforcement mechanism in place to guarantee compliance of these 
conventions.  Of course, reporting requirements exist that would require the U.S. to report on 
its compliance.  In so doing, it would face the embarrassment and criticism of the current 
status of the right to education by the international community but would this be enough to 
make the U.S. comply with international human rights standards.  This is unknown.   
IV. Conclusion 
 The right to education in the U.S. has a long and varied history.  It has always been a 
localized practice provided by the states and local authorities without formal recognition of a 
federal fundamental positive right to education.  However, in an ever smaller world, the 
necessity to be a true democratic leader grows.  Central to a true democratic government is 
the availability and right to education for its citizens.  Without ratification of the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, the U.S. continues to exude hypocrisy for its efforts worldwide, spouting its superior 
democracy but not practicing it, specifically in regard to a positive right to education.   
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 This paper specifically focused on the status of the right to education.  With the U.S. 
political landscape, a federal positive right to education would create vast changes in the 
economic structure.  It would also require the federal government to deal with racism and an 
inadequate voice for children which will present difficulties for the courts and legislature.    
 Even though the Committees used to enforce the conventions would have no real 
enforcement power over the U.S., it would still be subject to even more criticism and 
embarrassment than it is currently.  Under the current structure, the U.S. hides behind its 
Constitution and creates illusory statements of upholding human rights.  To bring the U.S. in 
compliance with international human rights standards on education, the federal government 
would need to be willing to affirmatively recognize the right to education and prioritize its 
vast resources in different ways.  It would also have to make a firm commitment to the 
international community to assist and continue to further the right to education 
internationally.  
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